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COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. WAY.

[18 C. (2d)

been expressly found by the legislative bodies of the taxing
units concerned, as required by the provisions of section 1.1.
The instant refunding proceeding, contemplating the reduction of the assessment indebtedness by approximately twothirds and the cancellation of the aforementioned delinquent
taxes prior to the fiscal year of 1939-1940, will restore the
delinquent property to the tax roll so that the current and
future taxes will be paid with respect to this latter, as well as '
other land in the road improvement district, and each parcel, rather than merely twelve, will assume its proper share of
the tax burden. It is obvious that the taxpayers cannot be
prejudiced by any diminution of their obligations. Where
,the change' made in the existing law by the subsequent
legi;lation redounds to the material advantage of the taxpayers, there is no impairment of the taxpayers' contract
rights. (Metropolitan Water District v. Toll, supra, at
p. 429.)
,
None of the objections advanced by respondent against the
legality of this refunding proceeding are, in our opinion, well
taken.' .As section 1.1 of the Refunding Assessment Bond
Act of 1935, as amended, impairs neither the rights of the
general obligation bondholders nor those of the taxpayers,
an(las its'provisions do not contravene any constitutional
'inhibition, .it must be sustained as a valid legislative enactment.. It therefore follows that it is the duty of the respond'entto: ID;ake';and prepare a diagram of the property within
Road Improvement District No. 38 of the County of San Ber'nardino; and also to prepare a reassessment for the purpose
of 'refunding the outstanding indebtedness of this district.
<,'Let.the ,peremptory writ issue as prayed for.
" 'Gibson, C~ J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J.,
.concurred.
"JB;OUSEft,J.-I dissent.
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[L. A. No. 17850. In Bank.-Oct. 1, 1941.]

PAUL H. BRUNS, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys at Law-Disbarment-Proceedings-Board of Gov-

ernors-Conclusiveness of Recommendation.-The Board of
Governors after adopting the findings of the local committee
has jurisdiction to order a discipline more severe than that
recommended without first hearing the cause de novo or taking
additional evidence.
[2] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Dishonesty-False Assurances and Statements as to Action Filed.-The acceptance of
a fee by an attorney from a client upon a false assurance
that an action would be filed, and a later false statement that
an action had been filed justify a suspension in excess of
three months, notwithstanding a claim of the attorney that
he was under a physical and mental strain at the time and
that he attempted to make restitution.

,

[3] Id.-Disbarment-Misconduct Toward Client-Negligence in
Respect to Trust Funds.-Where an attorney participated
in a business enterprise and opened a "trustee" bank account
on which, he drew checks subsequently returned for insufficient
funds, and where he failed to account for funds handled and
offered no credible explanation of his failure to keep a record
thereof, his disregard of the fiduciary relation and absence
of fair dealing in handling the affairs of his ignorant, credulous or impecunious clients, taken in conjunction with his
past record and the apparent failure to profit by previous
disciplinary action, justified his disbarment.

PROCEEDINGS to review recommendation of disbarment.
Petitioner disbarred.
Paul H. Bruns in pro. per., L. J. Styskal and M. E. Barth
for Petitioner.

j

W. Eugene Craven and Joe Crider, Jr., for Respondent.

it:

f...

'

,! ~

3. See 9 Cal. Jur. Ten-yearSupp. 411; 5 Am. Jur. 423.
McK. Dig. References:' 1. Attorneys at Law, § 172 (3); 2. Attorneys at Law, § 149 (4); 3. Attorneys at Law, § 140.
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BRUNS V. STATE BAR.
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THE COURT.-In two separate proceedings instituted
before a local. administrative committee of The State Bar
of·. California, petitioner was charged with (1) acceptance of
a' fee 'from a client upon false assurances that a suit would
be filed, misrepresenting to the client that suit had been filed
although no;, legal .services of value were performed, and
(2) ,misuse of funds, failure, to defend legal actions, refusal
to; account for funds received,and other professional misconduct, in. connection with petitioner's employment as an
attorney by members of a milk producers' association.
In the first proceeding the local committee recommended
that petitioner ,be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of three' months. In' the second proceeding the committee recommended, on the basis of the facts found together
with petitioner's past record, a three year period of suspensIon.. The causes were consolidated for presentation to the
Board of Governors. When petitioner failed to appear before the board at the appointed time, after a postponement
of the hearing had been granted at his request, the matter
\vas taken under submission upon the record made before the
local committee together with petitioner's past record. The
past record included a public reproval administered by the
board on September 21, 1929, in disciplinary proceedings
L. A. No. 284 and No. 285, and a three months' suspension
ordered by this court on July 17, 1931. (Bruns v. State
Bar, 213 Cal. 151 [1 Pac. (2d) 989].) Upon reviewing these
records the board adopted the findings of the local committee, but recommended that petitioner be disbarred.
[1] Petitioner contends that after adopting' the findings
of the local committee, the Board of Governors had no jurisdiction to order a discipline more severe than that recommended, without first hearing the cause de novo or taking
additional evidence. A complete answer to this contention
is found in Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal. (2d) 550 [107 Pac.
(2d) 10], and cases there cited. See also Maggart v. State
Bar, 7 Cal. (2d) 495 [61 Pac. (2d) 451]. Petitioner argues
that if he had known that his punishment might be increased
he would have appeared before the board. His absence was
of his' own volition, however, after full opportunity to testify
had been accorded him, and affords no basis for compelling
the board to accept the committee's recommendations or to
limit its jurisdiction.

"
'
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The findings of the local committee correctly represent the
facts shown by the record in each proceeding.
First Proceeding, L. A. No. 1023 (3774):
In 1939 one C. H. Englesby, who had first met petitioner a
few weeks previously, consulted him as an attorney, presenting to him the case of his sister-in-law, Eliza Jane Fear, a
destitute blind woman, over 8.0 years of age, who many years
before had loaned her brother James various sums of money
totaling, with interest, about $10,500, which he had failed
to repay. The brother signed a note which was subsequently
lost. A substantial portion of the amount borrowed was used
to educate his two daughters. Mr. Englesby asked petitioner
whether the money could be collected from the daughters,
and petitioner advised that in his opinion not only did a good
cause of action exist against them, but they could be compelled to contribute to their aunt's SUpport. He agreed to
handle the case for a fee of $100 and an additional $27.50
for costs. These sums, he was told, would be saved by the
aunt from her monthly pension check.
[2] On August 5, 1939, Mr. Englesby paid petitioner
$80 on the fee, and thereafter $12 toward costs, and petitioner promised to file suit. On November 5, 1939, he told
Mr. Englesby that an action had been filed. This statement
was untrue. At the hearing before the local committee petitioner claimed that under his fee arrangement he was not
obligated to file suit until the full amount of the fee was
paid. He advanced the necessity for research as another
excuse for his failure to act. Very little research would have
revealed that no cause of action existed in favor of the aunt
against her nieces either for support or for the money loaned
their father. The local committee gave petitioner every opportunity to make restitution before taking action on the
charge against him. On May 29, 1940, he stated that he
believed he could restore the money to his client within fifteen or twenty days. On August 21st, three months later,
he had only repaid $65, and claimed that it had been impossible for him to raise the rest of the money.
Petitioner now argues that the evidence does not justify
'an order of suspension or disbarment. He states that the
giving of erroneous advice through ignorance is not punishable, and' that he honestly believed that a cause of
action existed when he so informed Mr. Englesby. In plead-
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. ing for leniency he asserts that he was under a physical and
mental strain at the time in question, and that he has attempted to make restitution. These factors, however, cannot excuse either the failure to take any action after most
of the agreed fees had been collected, or the misrepresentation to the' client that an action had been filed. The evidence
on this ma.tter would warrant the imposition of a longer
period ,of suspension than the three months recommended
by the local committee, and considered in conjunction with
petitioner's. record of other misconduct, it affords strong
-~upport for the order of disbarment recommended by the
Board of Governors.
Second proceeding, L. A. No. 1005 (3711):
In February, 1938, certain milk producers, assisted by petitioner and one Gray, organized the Producers' Cooperative Creamery Company, a copartnership, for the purpose
'of processing and selling their milk at better prices than
those' previously . ·. received from. dairies. The producers,. of
Holland Dutch' descent, had difficulty in speaking or under'standing. tlie;English .language, and relied upon petitioner to
-advise them:'~',_They . were unsuccessful in their business and
in July, 1938,. they decided to leave the plant they had leased
and to abandon' operations. During the period from Febru'ary to July/1938,petitioner acted as attorney for Mr. Gray
and for the: producers,· but he had nothing to do with the
:managemeht 'of the business or the funds. Mr. Gray, how"ever; \was·~also interested in a selling organization called. the
.Dairy; Guild." He and petitioner succeeded in obtaining the
permission; o:ir~ the producers to sell their milk, after it was
, ;processed cat: Guernsey Gold Seal Farms. In .August, 1938,
-this!arrangement was put into operation. The. producers
:deliv'ered-· milk, to .the Guernsey Gold Seal Farms for proc~essing.' ,It:was then sold by Mr. Gray, doing business.as the
;:D~iry:Guild:.;jPetitioner participated actively in the. enter',prise and'opened a "trustee" account with the bank. All
;funds collected by: Mr.' Gray from milk sales, less certain
expenses and salaries, were delivered to him, and he had
'complete control of· this money. In the beginning from $30
·to$35 wasturned over to him daily, but the receipts dwindled
to' nothing' in a period of approximately sixty days because
the producers' were dissatisfied and supplied less and less
milk. Petitioner drew. checks on the "trustee" account in
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favor of the producers and others. Some of these checks
were returned for insufficient funds. After the institution
of criminal proceedings part were paid; others still remain
unpaid. Demands were made upon petitioner for an accounting and on numerous occasions he promised to furnish
it, but failed to do so. It was not until JUly 25, 1940, at the
last hearing before the local committee in the present proceeding, that he explained for the first time that he was
unable to make an accounting because his records had been
destroyed in a flood at Tujunga. The record substantiates
the committee's finding that this was improbable.
Between August and December, 1938, petitioner undertook
to represent the producers in litigation arisiug out of their
ubandonment of the plant leased by them and the unsuccessful operation of their business from February to September, 1938. Three suits were brought against the producers. In Kurtz v. Wassenaar et al., L. A. MuniCipal Court
No. 484,614» an action for rent, there was no defense, and a
default judgment was entered against the producers in May,
)
1939.
In Guernsey Gold Seal v. Wassenaar, L. A. Municipal
Court No. 497,197, petitioner served and :tiled an answer
and cross-complaint on behalf of the producers. The plaintiff, however, without the knowledge of petitioner, secured
from each of the defendant producers an affidavit denying
petitioner's authority to represent them. Upon the basis
of these affidavits a motion to strike the answers and crosscomplaints was granted, and a default judgment was entered.
Apparently the prodUcers did not fully understand the
meaning or possible effect of their affidavits, but, so far as
the evidence shows, petitioner was entitled to and did rely
Upon them. He therefore advised the counsel for the plaintiff in the third action (Keeley v. Wassenaar et al., Los Angeles Superior Court 'No. 433,791), in which he had been
securing oral and written extensions of the time for appearance, that his authority to represent the defendant producers had been repUdiated.
The evidence regarding petitioner's failure to defend the
1ega) actions properly and regarding other phases of the
matters charged Was inconclusive, and the local committee
concluded that petitioner did not violate his duties as an
attorney in any of the respects charged except in his refusal
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and failure. to account for funds handled from. August to
O<!tober, 1938. Petitioner offered no credible explanation for
his' failure, to· keep' a record of the funds received by him
in trust, for the producers and disbursed by him on their
behalf. The lack of any financial statement or report made
it impossible to determine whether petitioner had actually
misappropriated any of the funds entrusted to him and his
excuses for this negligent handling of his client's affairs
only beclouded the question.
[3] The findings and conclusions of the committee are
amply supported by direct evidence of petitioner's failure
to account' and other acts of negligence and omission. Petitioner contends, however, .that even if the committee's conclusions are correct, his violations of duty involved no moral
turpitude and were not of sufficient consequence to serve
as the basis of either a prolonged suspension or disbarment.
He argues that as he was neither the collector of sales receipts nor the bookkeeper for the business, he was under no
record of the funds of his clients
obligation to produce
which were delivered to him in trust and disbursed by him
under his. complete control. This argument demonstrates a
lack of understanding of the. duties and obligations arising
out of a fiduciary relationship. It would be a distortion of
justice to permit· a trustee, or attorney handling funds of a
client, to escape responsibility by the simple act of not
keeping any record or data from which an accounting might
be made.
Repeated .acts of negligence and omission may involve
moral turpitude and prove as great a lack of fitness to practice law as affirmative violations of duty. (Marsh v. State
Bar, 210 Cal. 303 [291 Pac. 583] ; Marsh v. State Bar, 2 Cal.
(2d) 75. [39 Pac. (2d) 403] ; Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Cal.
(2d) ·17 [63Pac~' (2d) 1133]; Trusty v. State Bar, supra.)
The evidence here discloses a complete disregard for the
fiduciary relation of an' attorney to his clients and an absence of fair dealing in handling the affairs of ignorant,
credulous, or impecunious clients. (See Stanford v. State
Bar, 15 Cal. (2d) 721 [104 Pac. (2d) 635].)
'; . The consolidated record of the present proceedings, 'considered in conjunction with petitioner's past record (Bruns
v. State Bar, supra)~ attests the correctness of the conclusion that. the public interest will be best served and protected
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by petitioner's removal from practice. (Marsh v. State Bar,
2 Cal. (2d) 75 [39 Pac. (2d) 403] ; I{ennedy v. State Bar, 13
Cal. (2d) 236 [88 Pac. (2d) 920].) Although ten years have
elapsed since the previous disciplinary proceedings against
petitioner, in which he, was suspended for a period of three
months for deliberately misleading the court by a false averment as to custody of a minor in a petition for adoption, it is
apparent that the discipline then administered did not succeed in imparting to him an understanding of the duties of
an attorney to his clients and to. the public.
It is ordered that petitioner be disbarred from the practice
of law in the courts of this state, effective thirty days after
the filing of this decision.

a

~

CARTER, J., Dissenting._I dissent.
While the facts found by the local administrative committee with reference to the misrepresentation made by petitioner that he had filed an action on behalf of his client
when he had not done so, and his failure to render an accounting of money received by him in trust are sufficient to
justify disciplinary action against him, I cannot agree with
the holding in the majority opinion that a member of the
bar can be subjected to a disciplinary proceeding for mere
negligent conduct.
I still hold to the views expressed by me in my dissenting
opinions in the cases of Trusty v. State Bar, 16 Cal. (2d)
550, 554 [107 Pac. (2d) 10], and In re McKenna, 16 Cal.
(2d) 610, 612 [107 Pac. (2d) 258], and I disagree with
everything said in the majority opinion in the instant case
contrary to the views expressed by me in said dissenting
opinions.
Houser, J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied October
30, 1941. Carter, J., voted for a rehearing.
18

o.

(2d)-22

